INTRODUCTION
The worldwide political effervescence of "the long 1960s" (Isserman & Kazin 2000) contributed to a paradigm crisis in social scientific thinking about collective action. This prolonged decade of extraordinary upheaval in New York, Chicago, Berkeley, Paris, Rome, Berlin, Tokyo, Mexico City, Prague, Beijing, and elsewhere was the most intense period of grassroots mobilization since the 1930s. Civil rights and antiwar movements, youth and student rebellions, mobilizations in defense of regional autonomy and the environment and for the rights of women, gays and lesbians, the elderly, the disabled, and a host of other emergent groups, identities, and causes converged with an unprecedented wave of anticolonial and antiimperial insurgencies in poorer regions of the globe. Social scientists of various orientations concerned with geopolitics and revolution had ready-made categories ("national liberation," "subversion") for analyzing events in the "Third World." But the turmoil in the developed North highlighted the inadequacy of existing social scientific frameworks and gave rise to new and rich debates.
Even though anthropologists were well represented as participants in this tide of unrest and their 1960s sensibilities contributed to new conceptualizations of "interstitial politics" and of power, gender, colonialism, and the state (Vincent 1990) , they remained to a large extent on the periphery of social scientific theorizing about collective action. One notable exception was the Vietnam-era agrarian studies tradition
A CONVENTIONAL STORY OF SHIFING PARADIGMS
In the early 1970s, functionalism still held sway in U.S. sociology. Park and the Chicago School had, since the 1920s, juxtaposed "social organization"-institutionalized, conventional patterns of everyday life-to "collective behavior," a category that included crowds, "sects," fashions, and mass movements, all of which they saw as simultaneously symptoms of societal disequilibria and harbingers of new patterns of social relations (Park 1967 ). Smelser (1962) rejected the notion of "disequilibria" as "too strong" and attributed collective behavior to tensions that exceeded the capacity of a social system's homeostatic mechanisms and that constituted a source of new bases of Durkheimian-style solidarity. Related psychological theories explained the rise of totalitarianism as a mass response to economic crises and "magnetic leaders" by individuals with a "mob mentality" (Arendt 1951) or an "authoritarian character" (Fromm 1941). These theories about totalitarianism were of limited use in analyzing turmoil in largely democratic, affluent polities in the 1960s. Olson (1965) advanced a notion that remains a point of departure for much theorizing. An economist, Olson rejected theories based on the irrationality of individuals [although he also stated it would "be better to turn to psychology" than to economics to understand "fanatic" or "lunatic fringe" movements "in unstable countries" (1965, pp. 161-62)]. Instead, he posited individuals on contentious politics-that "we still know relatively little about the ample and charged territory between the cataclysmic upheaval of revolutionary war and the small incidents of everyday resistance, ... social struggles where people enter into open protest yet do not seek the total overthrow of the social order" (p. 3). Moreover, apart from a few individuals in each group whose work genuinely engages historical documentation and scholarship, the vast literature by historians on collective action tends to be surprisingly underutilized. so rational they would not participate in collective endeavors-a rather odd premise for the turbulent 1960s-because each could benefit from others' activity as a "free rider," pursuing low-risk self-interest at the group's expense. Like the "tragedy of the commons" model, which was later criticized (Prakash 1998) as divorced from culture or-alternatively-as a caricature of a historically specific homo economicus, this perspective explained collective action as the sum of strategic decisions by individuals, who could only be induced to join a group effort through incentives or sanctions. Given the stability of North America and Western Europe and the high risks many 1960s activists assumed-arrests, police beatings, ruined careers-"rational choice" did not appear to be a promising avenue of interpretation Marxism, still in or close to the mainstream in European universities in "the long 1960s," viewed conflict in capitalist societies as revolving around the fundamental contradiction between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. In all but the most heterodox Marxist (Thompson 1971 ) tendencies, class interest and historical agency derived unproblematically from class position (although classes "in" and "of' themselves raised less easily resolved issues of consciousness and hegemony). This framework too was of little use in making sense of movements in the 1960s that frequently had largely middle-class leadership and multiclass constituencies.
By the mid-1970s, two distinct perspectives emerged that attempted to fill the apparent theoretical vacuum: the "identity-oriented" or European paradigm [also widely termed new social movements (NSMs)] and the "resource mobilization" or American paradigm (Cohen 1985 For Touraine (1988) , among the first and most prolific advocates of a NSMs approach, the issue of social movements has two dimensions, loosely derived from aspects of Marx's and Weber's thought. The first is the notion of a "central conflict" in society; for Marx, this was the struggle between labor and capital in industrial society. But, Touraine argues, with the passage to a "postindustrial" society, laborcapital conflict subsides, other social cleavages become more salient and generate new identities, and the exercise of power is less in the realm of work and more in "the setting of a way of life, forms of behavior, and needs" (1988, p. 25). The main Weberian element in Touraine's approach is the concept of "the actor" as key protagonist of "social action." In postindustrial society, diverse collectivities have a growing capacity to act on themselves and to struggle for "historicity"-"the set of cultural, cognitive, economic, and ethical models ... through which social practices are constituted" (1988, pp. 40-41). Touraine thus posits the "way of life" as the focus of contention; struggles that seek to affect the relations of domination characteristic of the "way of life" (with its forms of knowledge, mores, and investment) are "social movements." He explicitly excludes from this category, however, forms of "collective behavior" that "defend" the social order or "social struggles" directed at the state. Melucci (1989) 1985 ) delineated characteristics they saw as particular to the NSMs and that contrasted with the "old" labor or working-class movement. Although the "old" labor movement upheld class as the primary social cleavage, category of analysis, organizational principle, and political issue, the NSMs emerge out of the crisis of modernity and focus on struggles over symbolic, informational, and cultural resources and rights to specificity and difference. Participation in NSMs is itself a goal, apart from any instrumental objectives, because everyday movement practices embody in embryonic form the changes the movements seek. The NSMs diffuse "social conflictuality to more and more numerous relations." This proliferation of "points of antagonism" produces "new social subjects" whose "multiple social positions" complicate interpretations of political agency based on a single, privileged principle of identity (Laclau & Mouffe 1985) .
If NSMs theorists in Europe tended to explain collective action as a response to "claims," grievances, or postindustrial society, on the other side of the Atlantic a growing coterie of social scientists pointed out that the mere existence of discontent, which was presumably omnipresent, could not explain how movements arose in particular times and places. but professed to have solved the "free rider" puzzle by analyzing the resourcesmaterial, human, cognitive, technical, and organizational-that movements deployed in order to expand, reward participants, and gain a stake in the political system. Resource mobilization (RM) theory, with its focus on the construction of "social movement industries" made up of "social movement organizations," regarded collective action mainly as interest group politics played out by socially connected groups rather than by the most disaffected. Movement "entrepreneurs" had the task of mobilizing resources and channeling discontent into organizational forms. Resource availability and preference structures became the perspective's central foci rather than the structural bases of social conflict (as in Touraine's version of NSMs) or state and market assaults on the private sphere (as in Melucci's and Habermas's versions).
EDELMAN
In underscoring the importance of mobilization processes and well-endowed organizations (and competition among the latter), the RM paradigm tended to disregard situations in which social movements, usually of the very poor, emerged with few resources or where overt organization-in contexts of extreme inequality, severe repression, and hopeless odds-endangered participants, producing "shadowy" (Piven & Cloward 1977) , "submerged" (Melucci 1989) , or "hidden" forms of resistance (Scott 1990 ) that might or might not lead to collective action (Burdick 1998). By viewing social movements as interest group politics, the paradigm understood "success" primarily as the achievement of policy objectives rather than in relation to broader processes of cultural transformation. RM proponents eventually conceded as well that their framework did not deal adequately with "enthusiasm, spontaneity, and conversion experiences" or the "feelings of solidarity and communal sharing" that rewarded movement participants (Zald 1992, pp.
330-31).
Several scholars influenced by the American paradigm advocated incorporating a focus on states and on "political opportunity structure" (POS) into the RM model's concern with the internal dynamics of organizations. The POS approach tended to examine movement strategizing in the context of the balance of opportunities-threats for challengers and facilitation-repression by authorities (Tarrow 1998 ). Some POS scholars who worked with European case materials emphasized a diachronic approach, studying the frequency of contentious events over long durations (with methods influenced byAnnales historians' "serial" history and their distinction between "events," "conjunctures," and "longues durees") ( Critics noted that the POS perspective gave little attention to discursive aspects of identity, gender, the social construction of POS itself, or its local and international aspects (Abdulhadi 1998). They further charged that POS was too broad and imprecise, "a dustbin" (Della Porta & Diani 1999, p. 223) or "a sponge that soaks up virtually every aspect of the social movement environment... an all-encompassing fudge factor ... [which] may explain nothing at all" (Gamson & Meyer 1996, p. 274). Increasingly, POS proponents came to see it as one element of a broader political process, which included greater emphasis on the cultural-historical sources of discontent, protest, and mobilization (and which was distinct from-and apparently incognizant of-the similarly named perspective that evolved out of Manchester anthropology). By the 1990s, proponents of the political process approach echoed Cohen's (1985) 2"Historical-structural" approaches "show ideology, values, traditions, and rituals to be of consequence and trace the importance of culture to group, organization, and community dynamics and to other features of social structure. Yet they never presume that protest is mechanically determined by social structure. They show the patterning of defiance to be contingent on historical circumstances" (Eckstein 1989, p. 3).
interactions with states were pertinent in Latin America (Foweraker 1995 Within Latin America, recent studies of collective action cluster geographically, mirroring the concentration of earlier social scientific production in certain selected places. The 1994 Zapatista uprising in the southern Mexican state of Chiapas has inspired an extraordinary outpouring of scholarly work, much of it directed at informing a sympathetic public or mobilizing solidarity. Drawing on three decades of work on Chiapas, Collier (1994) , produced less than a year after the Zapatistas' rebellion, remains an essential reference. Emphasizing agrarian rather than indigenous sources of insurgency, especially the constitutional modifications that effectively ended land reform, Collier describes how community factionalism and population growth generated an exodus of disaffected migrants to remote jungles in eastern Chiapas. Although the Zapatistas condemned the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and warned of its deleterious consequences for Mexico's peasantry, linking the insurrection to NAFTA, Collier says, was a "pretext," because other grievances had kindled the movement during years of clandestine organizing. In 1994, the origins of the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) were unclear. Harvey (1998), whose research began nearly a decade before the uprising, details the multiple strands of peasant, indigenous, and student organizing that eventually coalesced in the EZLN. In analyzing the Zapatistas' struggle on behalf of Chiapas Indians and the Mexican poor in general, Harvey maintains that the construction of democracy in Mexico often depends on informal local and regional, rather than formal national-level processes.3 Womack (1999) introduces a first-rate collection of primary documents on Chiapas and extends inquiry forward and backward in time. He relates the erratic course of EZLN-govemment negotiations and also traces the notorious intransigence, venality, and bigotry of contemporary highland elites to their conquistador ancestors' schemes to defraud the Crown of tribute and to racialize space in their urban centers. Drawing on a decades-long involvement with Chiapas, Nash (1997) indicates how Zapatista outreach campaigns are elements of a broader project of mobilizing civil society and of redefining modernist notions of democracy in a pluriethnic Mexico.
The Zapatista case is significant not only for its reverberations within Mexico, but also because it figures as a prototype for sometimes rhapsodic claims about a new period characterized by "informational" (Castells 1997) When NSMs perspectives traveled outside of social democratic Europe, the inclusion in their purview of major movements in Latin America-human rights and democratization, indigenous and minority peoples, Christian-based communities, the urban poor, street children-entailed a recognition of economic and power inequalities as key dimensions of collective action. This did not mean a resort to an obsolete, unidimensional class analysis, however, because the actors in motion went way beyond the traditional proletariat and because investigations of real movements nearly always uncovered participants from a range of class origins and intense contention over issues of identity and representation. This continued significance of class or distributive conflicts led many Latin Americanists to eschew NSMs terminology altogether and to speak instead of "popular" (literally, "people's") movements (Foweraker 1995) .
PERIODIZATION DEBATES: SO WHAT'S NEW?
One irony of the stress on newness of NSMs was that emerging movements of women, environmentalists, gays and lesbians, and oppressed minorities, as well as anticolonial forces in the Third World, sought to uncover hidden histories of their political ancestors in order to fortify their legitimacy and forge new collective identities. This rediscovery of the complexity of old and first-wave social movements was part of wider efforts to theorize periodizations of collective action through examining "origins," "waves," "cycles," and "protest repertoires." The discussion of movements in terms of origins has occurred chiefly in relation to environmentalism. Two recent works highlight what is at stake (Grove 1995 , Judd 2000 . Efforts to theorize the Northern environmentalist movements that arose in the 1960s, while acknowledging their diversity, usually argued that affluence and urbanization produced an appreciation and need for natural amenities. Melucci, in an uncharacteristically blunt declaration, insinuated that contemporary environmental movements are offspring of a "new intellectual-political elite" living in a "gilded but marginalizing ghetto" (Melucci 1996, p. 165). Similar "postmaterialist" premises extended to explanations of nineteenth-and early twentieth-century conservation campaigns as projects of "enlightened elites" or even of "a gentry overwhelmed by industrialization" (Castells 1997, p. 121). Against this predominant outlook, Grove (1995) attributes the rise of environmentalism to Europe's encounter with the tropics and to the devastation caused by rapacious plantation economies. Judd, focusing on rural New England, also challenges the thesis of the elite origins of conservation, which he says derives from a "tendency to glean evidence of rising concern about forests from federal publications, national journals, or writings of prominent thinkers" (2000, pp. 90-91). In a meticulous study of local sources, he finds a pervasive conservation ethic, rooted in common uses of forest, pasture, and farmland, which superseded private property rights until well into the nineteenth century. After 1870, "conservation took on class overtones" (2000, p. 178) as genteel anglers, hunters, and federal bureaucrats took up the cause, reshaping notions about the place of "nature" in agrarian landscapes, as well as nature itself. The thesis of conservation's upper-class origins, Judd maintains, contributes to demagogic efforts today to paint environmentalism as an elite conspiracy unfairly implemented at great cost to the working poor.
Guha & Martinez-Alier (1997) trace early environmentalism to the destruction wrought by the industrial revolution at home and in colonial territories and to a heterogeneous collection of thinkers, such as Aldous Huxley, Mahatma Gandhi, and urbanist Lewis Mumford. The main contribution of the work, however, is its trenchant critique of developed-country overconsumption and its elaboration of commonalities and distinctions between movements. They find postmaterialist environmentalisms in the "empty-belly" South ("essentialist eco-feminism," which sees poor women as embodying intrinsic "naturalness," and "deep ecology" tendencies, which revere biotic integrity more than human needs), as well as ones in the "full-stomach" North (environmental justice movements), which deploy the language of class and, at times, race to organize. "Social conflicts with ecological content" include struggles against "environmental racism" (siting dumps in minority communities), "toxic imperialism" (waste disposal in poorer countries), "ecologically unequal exchange" (based on prices which do not reflect local externalities), the North "dumping" subsidized agricultural surpluses in the South (to the detriment of small farmers there), and "biopiracy" (corporate appropriation of genetic resources without recognition of peasant or indigenous intellectual property rights).
Within feminism, the periodization discussion has been cast in terms of "waves," a convention that reveals and conceals key continuities and ruptures in forms of exclusion and of women's collective action. The demands of different national "first-wave" women's movements are usually said to have centered on suffrage and political rights [although it is also clear that issues of sexuality and male violence were important in contexts as varied as Germany (Grossmann 1995) and Puerto Rico (Findlay 1998)]; "second-wave" movements in the 1960s and 1970s demanded equity in the workplace and domestic unit, exposed the political foundations of seemingly personal circumstances, and championed a range of new rights, from access to abortion to protection from sexual harassment; and "thirdwave" feminists, generally born after 1963 and active in the 1990s and after, take cultural production and sexual politics as key sites of struggle, seeking to fuel micropolitical struggles outside of formal institutional channels.
Historians who located first-wave feminism in the mid-nineteenth to the early twentieth century usually did so provisionally, concerned that such clear-cut categorizations obscured significant antecedents as well as major variations between, say, the United States and Norway, or India and France (Sarah 1983); indeed, arguments for the inclusion of women in "the rights of man" reach back to the French Revolution (Scott 1996) The waves formulation is problematical in that it privileges political generations and tends to mask variation among movement participants and organizations along lines of age, class, race, and sexual orientation, as well as between-and after-wave activity. In the United States, for example, linking the first and second waves were the elite-led National Women's Party (which provided many alumnae to the second wave) and the Communist-dominated Congress of American Women, which for 5 years following World War II boasted some 250,000 members (several of whom were leading historians of the first wave and activists of the second wave) before it dissolved during the 1950s red scare (Rosen 2000). Whittier (1995) points out that numerous local radical feminist collectives were active during the hostile 1980s interval between the second and third waves but that their rejection of mainstream politics often rendered them invisible to social movements scholars whose main focus was national organizations.
Political process theorists did not generally draw sharp distinctions between waves or between new and old movements but some nonetheless posited a significant break between the "parochial," defensive forms of collective action characteristic of Europe up to the mid-nineteenth century (charivaris, machine-breaking, field invasions, food riots) and the modem repertoire of contention that flowered after 1848 with the consolidation of nation-states. Tilly (1986, p. 392), for example, described the social movement as a challenge to the state that employs a protest repertoire of public meetings, demonstrations, and strikes and that attempts to bargain with established authorities on behalf of its constituency.
Tarrow (1998), also employing a political process perspective, shared Tilly's notion of a fundamental shift in protest repertoires around the mid-nineteenth century. For Tarrow, however, the principal concept for periodization was the "protest cycle" [which in later work (1998) he termed cycle of contention], a time of heightened activity typically involving more than one movement.
Although the claims of some 1980s NSMs enthusiasts that NSMs represented a fundamental rupture with a putative, unitary old movement were quickly rec- Among the dramatic shifts occurring out of struggles for new rights is the changing view of disability. Charlton (1998) chronicles how people considered disabled in southern Africa, Asia, and the Americas organized, often against the wishes of paternalistic, able-bodied advocates, to make notions of normality more inclusive and to "break with the traditional perception of disability as a sick, abnormal, and pathetic condition" (p. 10). Disability oppression has interrelated sources: poverty and powerlessness, resulting from both economic exclusion and underdevelopment (four fifths of the world's disabled live in poor countries); views of the disabled as degraded and aberrant, which legitimize exclusionary practices; and internalization by the disabled themselves of attitudes of self-loathing and self-pity, which hinder understanding of their situation and organizing around it. To perhaps a greater extent than with other movements, the aspirations of the disabled intersect with struggles against other forms of discrimination and for housing and veterans' rights, a ban on land mines, the democratization of technology and scientific knowledge, and the creation or preservation of workplace opportunities and social safety nets. They also, however, complicate the demands of other movements in ways outsiders seldom anticipate. Saxton (1998), for example, in a searing critique of assumptions about prenatal diagnosis and selective abortion, challenges the belief that the quality of life for disabled people is necessarily inferior and that raising a child with a disability is an undesirable experience.
The reproductive rights movement emphasizes the right to have an abortion; the disability rights movement, the right not to have to have an abortion.
(p. 375; emphasis in original).
Other identity-based social movements have found expanding mainstream conceptions of normality a source of internal contention. This is dramatically illustrated in the course of gay and lesbian politics since the 1969 Stonewall rebellion. Early gay liberation movements practiced consciousness raising, exalted longrepressed sexualities, contested the dominant sex/gender system, openly occupied public space, and struggled for nondiscrimination and the depathologization of homosexuality. The "assimilationist" advocacy groups that emerged out of more radical and inclusive gay liberation movements of the early 1970s engaged in a denial of difference intended to gain access to mainstream social institutions and in positing an artificially homogeneous "gay essence" intended to build political unity (Cohen 2001) . With the advent of AIDS and rising homophobia in the 1980s, and a shift to confrontational tactics spurred by "the urgency of impending death" (Hodge 2000, p. 356), activists attempted to destabilize the "gay white middle-class identity," which had dominated the movement and to ally with a wider range of sexually, economically, and racially marginalized collectivities. In contrast to the assimilationists, this involved an assertion of fundamental difference with "heteronormativity," as well as a greater acknowledgment of how gay and lesbian identities were plural, socially constructed, and inflected by race, class, and national origin (Adam 1995, Stein 1997). This "queer" challenge to earlier gay activism professed to have resolved a central conundrum of identity politics by privileging "affinity," a shared opposition to class-, race-, and genderbased power and a common AIDS catastrophe rather than particular varieties of sexual desire. Some scholar-activists, however, maintain that academic "queer theory" is still mired in privilege, fails to follow the lead of the radical street movement, and gives scant attention to political-economic aspects of power at all levels, from the state and social class structure to the everyday practices that shape public space (Hodge 2000). The latter misgiving is shared by critics who question whether the category "queer" is an "overarching unifier" or just "another fraction in the overall mosaic of contemporary gay and lesbian organizing" (Adam 1995, p. 164).
The danger that identity-based politics could become a form of "narcissistic withdrawal" impelled by aspirations for individual self-realization and "political tribalism" (Melucci 1989 , p. 209) has produced similar commentaries from various directions. Claims of difference can fortify demands for new rights, but they can imply an abdication of rights as well. In a scathing attack on "cultural" or EDELMAN "difference" feminism, di Leonardo (1998) points out that journalistic and New Age "women's culture tropes" ignore political-economic dimensions of gender oppression and presuppose an immanent and superior female morality and nurturing capability that is held up as an alternative to the destructive militarism and environmental ruin caused by aggressive, patriarchal men. The implication of such arguments is that women deserve a place in society not because of any inherent right but because of their innate capacity to make things better, a stance that no other oppressed group is required to take. "Beneath the current black-female-student-chicano-gay-elderly-youth-disabled, ad nauseam, 'struggles,"' Reed (1999) proclaims in an acerbic yet cogent analysis of postsegregation African-American politics, "lies a simple truth: There is no coherent opposition to the present administrative apparatus" (p. 55). He attributes the "atrophy of opposition within the black community" to the breakdown of the civil-rights-era consensus, a media-anointed leadership so enamored of "authenticity" and "corporate racial politics" that it is incapable of acknowledging class and interest-group differentiation within the supposedly unitary "community," and an "academic hermeticism" that is isolated from political action and disinterested in distinguishing challenges to socioeconomic hierarchy from politically insignificant "everyday resistance" fads (1999, pp. 56, 151). Although it would not be hard to take issue with Reed's categorical gloom (or his indifference to other struggles in his ad nauseam inventory), his larger point-that class dynamics arise from and operate autonomously within and across identity-based collectivities-remains an unavoidable limitation on the emancipatory potential of movements defined in purely identity or difference terms.
A related pitfall of identity-based mobilizations is the facility with which many become little more than fodder for lucrative corporate marketing crusades. In an astute discussion of how branding practices have generated anticorporate activism, Klein (1999) maintains that "diversity" is now "the mantra of global capital," used to absorb identity imagery of all kinds in order to peddle "mono-multiculturalism" across myriad differentiated markets (p. 115). 
Warren's (1998) insightful study of pan-Maya activists, however, highlights complications both of identity-based mobilization and of calls for a new class politics. Beginning in the mid

RIGHT-WING AND CONSERVATIVE MOVEMENTS
Even though identity-based movements sometimes walk a fine line between celebrating particularities and promoting exclusivity or intolerance, the former dimension has received vastly more attention than the latter. NSMs scholars have largely skirted the issue of right-wing collective action, in part due to Touraine's (and others') limiting of the field to movements that seek "historicity" and in , in a landmark study of American right-wing populism from Bacon's rebellion in 1676 to the militias of the 1990s, note that classifying populist movements (which make antielitist appeals to "the people") along a right-left spectrum is often misleading. In contrast to Diamond, they stress that some rightist movements have advocated downward distribution of wealth and power, though not to everyone, and that some reject the state altogether and have tried to overthrow it (pp. 5-6). In an examination of putschist military officers in Argentina, homicidal landowners in Brazil, and violent paramilitary bands in Nicaragua, Payne (2000) defines her object as "uncivil movements," which employ deliberate violence and threats, as well as more conventional tactics and appeals to threatened identities, to advance exclusionary policies in democratic polities. Echoing Melucci's discussion of NSMs, she declares that uncivil movements "emphasize identity over interests. They use cultural symbols to empower new movements" (p. 17).
The emergence of antiimmigrant movements in Europe is among the cases that indicate the urgency of grasping how the right deploys cultural politics. Stolcke (1995) contends that new "doctrines of exclusion" differ from older varieties of organicist racism in positing irreducible cultural differences and deeply ingrained propensities to fear and loathe strangers and to wish to live among people of the same national group. This new cultural fundamentalism eschews claims about innate inferiority in favor of a rhetoric of difference. It posits a supposedly generic human attribute-anxiety about the "other"-in order to construct an antiuniversalist politics, assiduously avoiding rhetoric too directly suggestive of fascist and Nazi racism. Stoler (1999) , in a brief paper on the far-right Front Nationale (FN) in Aix-en-Provence, calls attention-like Stolcke-to a peculiar situation where racial discourse looms large and is simultaneously effaced or irrelevant. However, in contrast to frameworks that distinguish a new "cultural racism" from earlier "colonial racism," she indicates that the old racism also spoke "a language of cultural competencies, 'good taste' and discrepant parenting values" (p. 33), while the contemporary FN draws from a broader French cultural repertoire that includes a toned-down racism but also patriotic republicanism and anxieties about European integration and globalization. In the United States, a basic theme of right-wing populist narratives is "producerism," which "posits a noble hard-working middle group constantly in conflict with lazy, malevolent, or sinful parasites at the top and bottom of the social order" (Berlet & Lyons, p. 348). Although the Christian Right employs coded scapegoating to identify social problems with low-income communities of color, far-right white supremacists endorse an explicitly biological racism. Each tends to reinforce the other in public discourse. NSMs theorists, as well as government agencies, media, and human relations organizations, frequently brand right-wing movements "irrational" (Cohen 1985 In 1993, Falk introduced the phrase globalization-from-below to refer to a global civil society linking "transnational social forces animated by environmental concerns, human rights, hostility to patriarchy, and a vision of human community based on the unity of diverse cultures seeking an end to poverty, oppression, humiliation, and collective violence" (1993, p. 39). Explicitly directed against elite and corporate-led "globalization from above," the multistranded opposition that focus on transnational advocacy networks, which they distinguish from coalitions, movements, and "civil society" by their "nodal" organization and their use of information, symbolic, leverage, and accountability politics. They employ a concept of "network" that potentially includes social movements, but also media, unions, NGOs, and intergovernmental and governmental organizations.
When the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and Jody Williams, the ICBL had to wait for nearly a year to receive its half of the award money because it had no bank account and no address and was not an officially registered organization anywhere in the world (Mekata 2000) . Acephalous, horizontal, loosely networked alliances, of which the ICBL was emblematic, have emerged as major actors on the world scene and are frequently said to have important advantages vis-a-vis hierarchical organizations, particularly states, but also supranational governance and financial institutions. Although all-embracing definitions of the term network are common (Castells 1997), more restricted interpretations are most revealing as regards concrete instances of collective action. Among the most developed discussions of networks is the previously cited RAND study of the Zapatistas (Ronfeldt et al 1998) . Distinguishing between "chain," "star" or "hub," and "all-channel" networks, depending on the degree and type of interconnection between nodes, the RAND authors are mainly interested in developing a counterinsurgency strategy to replace 1980s "lowintensity conflict" doctrine. Among their concerns are "swarming," when dispersed nodes of a network converge on a target (as human rights NGOs did in Chiapas), EDELMAN and "sustainable pulsing," when "swarmers" coalesce, disperse, and recombine for attacks on new targets (as in anti-Maastricht marches in Europe and, one supposes, more recent demonstrations in Seattle and elsewhere). According to RAND, combating networks requires mimicking their form with interagency and multijurisdictional cooperation. States seeking foreign investment are most vulnerable to "netwar" campaigns that may damage their image or generate perceptions of instability. Giant corporations that invest heavily in linking brand images to consumer identities may be similarly threatened by informational campaigns, such as the antisweatshop movement, that expose pernicious environmental and labor practices (Klein 1999 , Ross 1997 .
Fox (2000) specifies with greater clarity than most theorists differences between transnational movements, coalitions, and networks, according to the extent to which they engage in mutual support and joint actions and share organized social bases, ideologies, and political cultures (with movements united along the most dimensions and networks along the fewest). He cautions that although the concepts are often used interchangeably and the categories sometimes blur, such analytical distinctions are necessary to keep in view imbalances and political differences within what might otherwise appear from the outside to be cohesive "transnational movements." Like Keck & Sikkink (1998), he is circumspect regarding hypotheses about "global" civil society because in their "hard version" such assertions suggest that changing international political norms and new technologies have fundamentally and universally altered the balance of power between state and society.
Appadurai (2000) also points to the limited success that transnational networks have had in "self-globalization" and attributes it to "a tendency for stakeholder organizations concerned with bread-and-butter issues to oppose local interests against global alliances" (p. 17), something amply documented by other researchers , Fox & Brown 1998 . His assertion that networks' greatest edge vis-a-vis corporations is that "they do not need to compete with each other" is perhaps less persuasive because networks and their nodes collaborate even as they vie for funding, supporters, and political access, and it is their loose, horizontal structure instead that confers advantages over hierarchical organizations, as the RAND group (Ronfeldt et al 1998) The end of the Cold War, while opening political space for all manner of civil society initiatives, also brought accelerated economic liberalization and pressure on welfare-state institutions in developed and developing countries. Even before the fall of the Berlin Wall, during the free-market triumphalism that swept much of the world in the 1980s, it became increasingly artificial to envision NSMs as unengaged with the state. Indeed, fiscal austerity and draconian "adjustments" in public-sector services made states key targets for forces seeking to safeguard historic social conquests and prevent further rollback of healthcare, education, housing, and transportation programs. It is by now commonplace to indicate how globalization generates identity politics (Castells 1997) , how attacks on welfarestate institutions fire resistance movements (Edelman 1999) , and how supranational governance institutions (NAFTA, IMF, World Bank, WTO) are part and parcel of each process (Ayres 1998, Ritchie 1996). It is less frequent to find analyses that link these trends to the expanding movement against corporate power and unfettered free trade which burst into public consciousness in 1999 during the Seattle demonstrations and riots against the WTO.6
At first glance the anti-free trade coalition of environmental, labor, and farm activists would seem an unlikely combination of social forces, demands, and political practices. Brecher et al (2000) argue that an "epochal change" is occurring, as disparate movements find common ground and press not just for new rights, but for adherence by corporations, states, and suprastate institutions to generally held norms. According to these authors, the apparent opposition among strengthening local, national, and global institutions is based on a false premise: that more power at one level of governance is necessarily disempowering to people at others. But today the exact opposite is the case. The empowerment of local and national communities and polities today requires a degree of global regulation and governance (p. 40).
Although duly cognizant of the divisions that afflict social movements, they point to successful campaigns to secure debt forgiveness for underdeveloped countries, to derail the proposed Multilateral Agreement on Investment, to secure ratification of a global climate treaty and a protocol regulating genetically engineered organisms, and to stall the WTO Millennium Round as examples of how grassroots pressure may establish and enforce new norms of conduct that better balance the public interest and special interests.
With a lucidity and empirical foundation far beyond anything by Habermas or Melucci, Klein (1999) examines how market-based invasions of public space and individuals' "life-worlds" have become an impetus for anticorporate activism. Global corporations' outsourcing of production had allowed them to concentrate on branding and on efforts to insinuate brand concepts into the broader culture via sponsorships, advertising, and "synergies" with the sports, arts, and entertainment worlds. In North America and elsewhere, this was taking place alongside privatization of services, forcing schools, neighborhoods, museums, and broadcasters to turn to corporations for support, thus commercializing what remained of the public sphere. Superstore-studded malls were reshaping communities into newly privatized pseudo-public spaces. Branding became so entangled with culture, space, and identities that consumers increasingly felt bombarded and 6The sudden media attention to anti-free-trade activism in the aftermath of the Seattle demonstrations raises the question of the effectiveness of social movements' use of disruptive and violent versus moderate tactics, about which there has long been substantial debate (Giugni 1999 
CONCLUSION
Recent writings on collective action suggest several areas of potential crossfertilization that could invigorate social movements research. Political process and NSMs theorists could benefit from a greater sensitivity to the historical and cultural processes through which some of their main analytical categories (frames, submerged networks, movement culture) are constructed, as well as a more genuine appreciation of the lived experience of movement participants and nonparticipants, something that is accessible primarily through ethnography, oral narratives, or documentary history. Ethnographic analyses of social movements have been most persuasive when they transcend the single-organization or single-issue focus of much collective action research in favor of broader examinations of the political and social fields within which mobilizations occur. Although ethnographers have often provided compelling, fine-grained accounts of collective action, they have been less consistent when it comes to developing dynamic analyses of either the larger political contexts in which mobilizations occur or the preexisting militant traditions and the organizing processes that constitute movements' proximate and remote roots. To anthropologists, some of the issues (rationality, free riders) that continue to engross the grand theorists of contentious politics may appear misplaced or peculiarly devoid of cultural content, but others of their concerns certainly merit greater attention (cycles of contention, protest repertoires) if anthropologists are to avoid reverting to their traditional disciplinary predilection for advancing ahistorical pseudo-explanations for phenomena with profound historical roots.
The role of ethnography in the study of social movements has been significant but seldom theorized. Ethnographers-like historians who work with documentary or oral sources-may have privileged access to the lived experience of activists and nonactivists, as well as a window onto the "submerged" organizing, informal networks, protest activities, ideological differences, public claim-making, fear and repression, and internal tensions, which are almost everywhere features of social movements. Some of these aspects raise questions that can be addressed only though ethnographic or ethnographically informed historical research. Weller's (1999) study of how environmentalism emerged from local temples in Taiwan, Whittier's (1995) specification of how lesbian communes contributed to keeping radical feminism alive in the 1980s, and the Schneiders' (2001) attendance at rural Sicilian picnics where mafiosi and antimafiosi feasted together, uneasily aware that they were antagonists in a larger cultural-political struggle, are merely a few examples of the kinds of processes available to ethnographic observers but largely invisible to those working at a temporal or geographical distance from the activities they are analyzing. As a collection of methods, however, ethnography alone-as traditionally conceived-is hardly sufficient for studying the deep historical roots or wide geographical connections of most contemporary mobilizations. Nor does ethnography necessarily innoculate researchers against the common pitfalls of overidentification with the movements they study, accepting activist claims at face value, or representing "movements" as more cohesive than they really are (Edelman 1999 , Hellman 1992 .
If anything has distinguished anthropological, as opposed to other, students of social movements, it may well be a greater preoccupation with the researcher's political engagement, from the "reinvented" anthropology of the early 1970s to the "barefoot" anthropology of the 1990s (Burdick 1998, p. 181). The tendency of collective action scholars to focus on groups and organizations with explicit programs for change is, as Burdick suggests, in effect an acceptance "of the claim of the movement to be a privileged site in the contestation and change in social values." Elevating the question of lack of participation to the same level of importance as mobilization, he charges that much "sociological writing on the 'freeloader' problem ring[s] a bit hollow and even a bit arrogant in its presumption ... that social movement organizational action is the only, or best, social change game in town" (1998, pp. 199-200) . In a candid account of his efforts to place research findings at the service of his activist interlocutors, he argues that accompanying a movement may, for the ethnographer, most usefully entail "reporting the patterned testimony of people in the movement's targeted constituency who on the one hand held views and engaged in actions very much in line with movement goals, but who on the other hand felt strongly put off, alienated, or marginalized by one or another aspect of movement rhetoric or practice" (1998, p. 191). In order to accomplish this, though, it is not the movement itself that becomes the object of study, but rather the broader social field within which it operates (cf. Gledhill 2000).
The widening of social fields implied by the rise of transnational activism suggests that this challenge will be even harder to meet in the era of globalization-frombelow. Over the past three decades, theorists have had to scramble to keep up with the rapidly evolving forms of contentious politics. From identity-based movements that allegedly eschewed engagement with the state, to mobilizations that targeted neoliberal efforts to decimate social-welfare institutions, to more recent struggles against corporate power and supranational goverance and international financial institutions, "scholars have come late to the party" (Keck & Sikkink 1998, p. 4). Part of the difficulty is recognizing transformative moments as they are being lived and even what comprises "movement activity." The new anticorporate activism, for example, employs an action repertoire that combines decidedly postmodern elements (informational politics, cyber-attacks, and "swarming") with others that hark back to early nineteenth-century forms of direct action, albeit with global rather than local audiences (uprooting genetically modified crops, ransacking corporate franchises). Whether or not we are on the verge of a new cycle of NSMs, it is already evident that understanding today's mobilizations will require new conceptions of what constitutes ethnography, observation, participation, and certainly engagement.
